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The Knowing Body
Nishida’s Philosophy of Active Intuition
(Koiteki chokkan)
Matteo Cestari
Pure experience and active intuition
KOiteki chokkan plays a pivotal role in the final thinking of
Nishida Kitard (1870-1945).1 In fact, as KOsaka Masaaki ex­
plains,2 from the beginning of the 1930s until his death in 1945, Nishi­
da structured his philosophy along three closely interwoven guidelines:
• This work was made possible in part by a grant from the Canon Foundation. I 
would like to express my sincere gratitude in particular to its Chairman Mr. Richard 
Burke and to Professor Abe Masao who patiently helped me in the difficult job o f  un­
derstanding Nishida’s texts.
1 The development o f  Nishida’s thought is generally divided into three periods: the 
first, from 1911 to 1923, is usually called psychologists or voluntaristic, being 
influenced by William James, Henri Bergson, and Johann Fichte. In the second period, 
from 1924 to about 1930, the birth o f  the “ logic o f  place” (jbasho no ronri
must be remarked. The final period, from about 1931 to the death in 1945, is character­
ized by a turn to an ontology o f  history. While Nishida was strongly influenced by Bud­
dhist tradition throughout his life, it is primarily with the series o f  Philosophical Es­
says {Tetsugaku ronbunshQ that the concept o f  koiteki chokkan acquires a
certain importance, even if it is anticipated in the idea o f  “ acting s e l f ’ {kO itekijiko fr 
AM  S B )  developed in Tetsugaku no konponteki mondai [Fundamental
Problems o f Philosophy, 1933-1934).
2 KOsaka Masaaki ifttfiiEffi, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku
[Nishida’s Philosophy and Tanabe’s Philosophy], Nagoya: Reimei shobd, 1949, 
163 ff.
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first, an ontology of historical reality, where he deals with the problem 
of Reality (Jitsuzai) as a historical world (rekishiteki sekai) in dialecti­
cal relationship with the historical-somatic self (rekishiteki shintaiteki 
jiko)\ secondly, the logical structure of this historical world, in which 
he discusses his logic of contradictory self-identity (mujunteki 
jikodOitsu no ronri ol&S); and finally, how human
beings stand in relation to, and within, this reality, which is exactly the 
point with which action-intuition deals.3 In the same term “ kOiteki 
chokkan" a twofold structure is clearly visible: action (creation, 
production), and intuition (vision, cognition, knowledge). An ap­
propriate translation might be either “ active intuition”  or “ action-intu­
ition,” but actually it is not easy to choose between the two. Both stress 
important characteristics of the notion: one, its noetic-subjective 
value, the other, the equivalence between the two moments inside its 
structure.4
3 KOsaka M., ibid.
4 For the German. E. Weinmayr suggests the term Handelunde Anschau ting, indicat­
ing the inadequacy of Nishida’s own translations of Tatanschauung, and hands- 
lungsgemafie Anschauung. For instance, Tatanschauung seems to imply the influence of 
the Fichtian idea o f Tathandlung, while actually that is not the case. (E. Weinmayr, 
“Nishida tetsugaku no konpon shogainen” [Various Fundamental Concepts of 
Nishida’s Philosophy], in Kayano Yoshio & Ohashi RyOsuke eds.,
Nishida tetsugaku, Kyoto: Minerva ShobO, 1987, 220-221). For the French, Nakagawa 
Hisayasu suggests intuition-acte (“ KOiteki chokkan to sono yakugo wo
megutte” [On KOiteki chokkan and its Translations], in Nakamura YQjirO chOsakushQ
GeppO 7, Dai VII kan, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993, 3-6).
5 With the exception of the pages of G. K. Piovesana (Recent Japanese Philosophi­
cal Thought. 1862-1962. A Survey, Tokyo: Enderle Bookstore, 1963, 110-115), as far 
as I know the only lengthy essay in Western languages about the concept o f koiteki
From a certain perspective, kOiteki chokkan can be interpreted as a 
return to the initial inspiration of Nishidian philosophy, namely, the 
fundamental idea of junsui keiken or “ pure experience,” the
pivotal concept of Nishida’s maiden work, Zen no kenkya [An
Inquiry into the Good] (1911). Nevertheless, the two concepts are sig­
nificantly different in their conceptual frames of reference. This makes 
kOiteki chokkan an important moment in Nishida’s thought. It seems 
quite odd, then, that this notion has not attracted more attention from 
Western critics.5 The importance of this concept was highlighted by 
Nishida himself in his foreword to the 1936 edition of Zen no kenkyU:
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The idea of “ Place” was made concrete (gutaika serare AH ft 
4*6ft) as “ Dialectical Universal”  (benshOhOteki ippansha ft 
and the position of “ Dialectical Universal”  was 
made direct (chokusetsuka serareta HgtfL-e feftfc) as the posi­
tion of “ active intuition” (koiteki chokkan). [. . .] What was 
defined as the world of “ direct experience” (chokusetsu kei- 
ken), “ pure experience” and so on, now has come to be 
thought of as the world of Historical Reality (rekishiteki ji- 
tsuzai). It is the very world of action-intuition, the very world 
of poiesis that is the world of pure experience.6
As is well known, junsui keiken is the original condition of unity be­
tween subject and object, before any distinction is added by ordinary 
consciousness, which in turn can be reduced to it. The same Nishida de­
fined such a conception which deals with problems of individual percep­
tion and states of consciousness as “ psychologistic.”
“ Pure experience” differs from kbiteki chokkan in its same theoreti­
cal premises.7 One, psychologistic, the other, ontologic, they almost ap­
pear as two opposite strategies of thinking: if pure experience—being a 
pre- and post-conscious immediacy—depreciates the rational, objec­
tive aspects of reality, such as language and logical method,8 in kbiteki 
chokkan, knowledge is conceived as a process inside the historical- 
chokkan is a translation o f  a work by Yuasa Yasuo (The Body. Toward an
Eastern M ind-Body Theory, New York: SUNY, 1987, chap. 2, “ Nishida KitarO’s View 
o f  the Body,”  49-74). Hereafter cited as The Body, (note: While this paper was being 
printed, I learned that Professor A. Jacinto-Zavala devotes two chapters o f  his book 
Fit os o f  (a de la transformation del mundo, Zamora: El Colegio de MichoacAn, 1989, to 
the theme o f koiteki chokkan.)
6 See Nishida Kitaro Zensha, Vol. 1 ,6-7; hereafter, indicated parenthetically as fol­
lows: (I, 6-7).
7 Kosaka Kunitsugu 'NCSM , Nishida KitarO. Sono shisO to gendai - t o
[Nishida Kitard. His Thought and Today], KyOto: Minerva ShobO, 1995, 
79-93.
’ In Zen no kenkyQ the philosopher’s purpose is clearly stated: to explain everything 
on the grounds o f  pure experience (1 ,4), while the reality is considered as a phenome­
non o f consciousness (ishiki no genshO (I, 52) Even if  here ishiki does not
mean a conscious subject, this betrays a psychologistic and monistic tendency. See 
also: Nishida KitarO, A n Inquiry into the Good, trans, by Abe Masao & C. Ives, 
London: Yale University Press, xxx; 42 ff.
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dialectical world. Nevertheless, in Nishida’s final philosophy, this pre­
eminence granted to dialectics does not imply the exclusion of concrete 
experience that was so central to his previous works. Instead, this con­
creteness is reformulated through the theme of the historical, practical 
body (rekishiteki jissenteki shintai which acts and
knows in the world as its self-expression.9  This theme actually replaces 
that of the original unity which precedes categorical distinction, as a 
typical statement of Zen no kenkyu. This replacement presupposes a 
certain amount of decisive rethinking, including a tendency to move 
from monism to pluralism. KOiteki chokkan is in part a consequence 
of this process. In this formulation, the dimension of the body, in its 
various facets and its closely-knit links with the world, acts as a symbol 
of complexity, around which the problem of knowledge in the histori­
cal world turns.
Considering Nishida from this perspective of the historical body and 
active intuition is a way of better appreciating how near he is to other 
important figures of contemporary philosophical discourse, such as 
Heidegger who insisted on the relational and practical character of the 
Being-in-the-World (In-der-Welt-sein).™ The end of modernity, as the 
triumphant era of the Hegelian system and identity, coincides with a 
radical crisis of the conception of a self-sufficient Subjectivity. This 
change of perspective means a confrontation with all the aspects of real­
ity, which Hegel will be accused of not having considered properly; but 
this will often be based on Hegel’s lesson.11 From this point of view, 
Nishida is not an isolated example. On the one hand, he patently in­
tends to overcome the Hegelian system.12 On the other, he owes much
’ Kosaka K., Nishida KitarO. Sono shisO to gendai, 79-81.
10 See particularly G. Chiurazzi, Hegel, Heidegger e la grammatlea dell’essere 
[Hegel. Heidegger and the Grammar o f Being], Roma: Laterza, 1996.
11 See L. Cortella, Dopo it sapere assoluto. L'ereditd hegeliana nell’epoca post- 
metafisica [A fter Absolute Knowledge. Hegelian Heritage in the Post-Metaphysical 
Era], Milan: Guerini, 1995.
12 According to Nishida, “ Hegel’s Universal does not contain the true individual. It 
does not contain our self as our W ill, our practical self. Hegelian Reason is opposed to 
the individual self as W ill. So much remains o f subjectivism”  (X I, 166). This criticism 
is probably correct, i f  Hegel is interpreted as a philosopher o f Consciousness. See ex­
pressions such as “ Individuality is the principle o f reality. In  fact, individuality is the 
consciousness through which the being-in-itself is also fo r another.”  (Phenomenology, 
527)
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to it. In fact, it is thanks to some fundamental Hegelian conceptual 
tools that Nishida tries to overcome modernity.13 However, in this con­
ceptual battle, in which he engages the West-as-modernity, Nishida is 
very much in tune to the urgings deriving from his own cultural back­
ground, particularly, the Buddhist tradition. Accordingly, in the 
logical-dialectical structure, and especially in the concept of negation, 
he binds together Hegelian terminology and a strong Buddhist orien­
tation. In this way, the Hegelian concept of identity becomes a non­
linear, nonunitary process, in which, as we shall see, the process itself 
is thoroughly self-negating.
In this essay, I would like to explain the notion of kbiteki chokkan in 
relation to Nishida’s ontological scheme. After an exposition of the 
fundamental motifs of the final thought of Nishida, I would like to 
examine action-intuition in the light of evaluations of the concept 
by Tanabe Hajime HjI tc, Takeuchi Yoshitomo and Yuasa
Yasuo In this way, I think it will be possible to appreciate the
pros and the cons of such an idea, inside and outside Nishida’s system.
The logical structure o f the historical world and 
the problem o f complexity
Like Heidegger, Nishida thinks that the conceptual approach follows 
the existential and practical relationship with the world. Philosophy 
takes as its object the richness of Reality, in which it is involved as well. 
It is just this complex Reality as “ object which is not an object” (taisho 
naki taisho an idea parallel to that of Hegelian totality—
which represents one of the most important interpretative keys to the 
entire work of Nishida. In this context, the final thought of Nishida 
gives the historical world a particular importance. It is only from such 
a world that every opposition (matter and spirit, subject and object, 
universal and particular) can exist. This world of interaction (qi- 
hataraki between individuals, and between Individual and
Universal, is called the World of dialectic Universal (benshohbteki ip-
13 For instance, in the Logic of Place (basho no ronri) it is assumed that subsump* 
tion (hOsetsu £2$) is the fundamental problem of knowledge. Nishida used many 
metaphysical concepts (such as the couple Universal/Particular), but he sometimes 
seems not to realize what we, after Heidegger, could call their onto-theological implica­
tions.
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pansha no sekai). As will be explained, koiteki chokkan clarifies the hu­
man way of knowing and acting, i.e.» of relating to this dialectical 
world.
How must this world of Reality be conceived? In Bashoteki ronri to 
shaky Oteki sekaikan [Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview, 
1945] Nishida draws a distinction between three levels of the world: the 
world of physics (butsuriteki sekai the world of biological
life (seibutsutekiseimei no sekai and finally the histor­
ical world (rekishiteki sekai (XI, 374-375) What really
makes the difference between these three levels of the world is the kind 
of interaction that typifies that realm of reality. Thus, in the realm of 
physics, the relationship between physical objects is always reversible 
and no action arises as a result of an individual initiative. It is always a 
reaction to a previous act, a pure effect in the chain of causality, 
proceeding by pure quantitative force (XI, 374). The dominant feature 
of the world of biological life is its irreversible orientation, due to a tem­
poral asymmetry: unlike a chemical-physical phenomenon, that is al­
ways reproducible and reversible, a biological organism is bom, grows, 
decays, and dies and it cannot be brought to its previous stage again. 
At this level, even if an autonomous act by the individual is possible, 
what is lacking is consciousness. Just the historical world is the most 
fully human world, the world of self-awareness (jikaku  g < ), 14 which 
transcends time, being a movement of self-transcendence of the world 
itself: “ [Inj/taAru] the self is in the world and at the same time it tran-
14 In Buddhism, self-awareness (jikaku) is close to the attainment of spiritual 
awakening (satori *)). In Nishida, the term jikaku is very complex. In the initial 
period, jikaku can hardly be distinguished from jikoishiki S f i l l  (the subjective self­
consciousness). Therefore, it is not easy to translate the term, for it fluctuates between 
the Buddhist and the psychologistic meaning. (J. C. Maraldo, “ Translating Nishida,** 
in Philosophy East and West, 39-4 [1989], 492-493) In the final period, this distinction 
between jikaku e jikoishiki is somehow consolidated. In this context, jikaku (self- 
awareness) is neither substantial (jittaiteki WB#]) nor functional (sayoteki f f /W ) but 
fundamentally locative (bashoteki as a horizon (suihei £ ¥ )  where the self sees
itself inside itself (jiko ni oite) (Omine Akira “ Hiai to ishiki. Nishida tetsugaku
ni okeru joitekina mono ni (suite** tOKLOi'T
[Grief and Consciousness. On the Emotional Element in Nishida’s Philosophy] in 
Nishida tetsugaku e no toi ‘ [Questions to Nishida’s Philosophy], Ueda
Shizuteru ed., Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1990, 102).
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scends the world. On the grounds of such a form of transcendence- 
sive- immanence, immanence -sive-t ran seen dence,15 the unrepeatable 
and unique self, the historical self can be conceived.”  (XI, 149)
15 The Latin sive  here translates the Japanese term soku  BP (“ that is; namely” ), 
which expresses “ the contrasting and nonetheless coexisting aspects o f  reality” (G. K. 
Piovesana, Recent Japanese Philosophical Thought, 248).
16 In Nishida’s definition o f  “ logic o f subject”  this subject is in the classical sense of 
substratum, or hypokelmenon. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, b. VII, chap. 3).
17 See Yusa Michiko, “ The Religious Worldview o f Nishida KitarO,” in Eastern 
Buddhist, 20-2 (1987), 67-68.
”  Nishida KitarO, Nippon bunka no mondai [Problems o f  Japanese Culture, 1940] 
Tokyo: Iwanami shinsho, 1982, 23-24; hereafter cited as nbm, 23-24.
This dialectical relationship between the human being and the world 
is the basic structure of the logic of contradictory self-identity. The 
criticism of Western philosophical subjectivism and the attempt to de­
velop a way of thinking more attentive to this world’s complexity are 
the two moments, destructive and constructive, within a strategy that 
aims, through criticizing the one-sidedness of subjectivism and objecti­
vism, to build an alternative new logic of complexity. According to 
Nishida, in the logic of the subject (shugoteki ronri i g ^ M S ) , 16 as in 
Aristotelian logic, the Individual is considered simply (tan ni as 
unknowable and irreducible to any rational explanation, but it can be 
grasped only through intuition. (XI, 434)17 This theory has the disad­
vantage that scientific reasoning is excluded and that human beings 
cannot be distinguished from animals. On the other hand, the conse­
quence of the logic of the predicate (jutsugoteki ronri as
with Kantian criticism, is that the Individual would be totally reducible 
to the categories of intellect. (VII, 18 ff.) However, this cannot explain 
the unpredictability and freedom of the concrete, existential individ­
ual. In both cases, the theorical approach is criticized as too limited. 
Human beings are in fact both law and instinct: they are consciousness, 
but not only consciousness, as in the logic of the predicate. (XI, 434) 
They are instinct, but not only instinct, as in the logic of the subject. 
(VII, 19)
It must not be left unsaid that by insisting on the one-sidedness of 
both types of logic, actually Nishida is already creating space for neces­
sary mediation, and the more the opposition is presented as sharp and 
incompatible, the more this mediation is an inescapable need. In this
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way, he concludes that simple oppositions aren’t able to explain the per­
son (jinkaku AM) as a creative element (sozoteki yOso frJfetoWO of a 
creative world (sOzOteki sekai 18 This historical world is the
19 This use (and abuse) by Nishida o f these logicistic definitions can be historically
understood as an answer to the need to build a “ new” philosophical logic which may 
grasp the essence o f the world. (See G. K. Piovesana, Recent Japanese Philosophical 
Thought, 245 ff.) This approach always hides the risk to identify contingent historical 
reality with unchangeable logical realm, thus (ideo)logically crystallizing the existent. 
This problem is first theoretical and then political; that is, Nishida’s philosophy seems 
too weak toward history, accepting everything as real just because it exists, eventually 
being almost unable to criticize the historical world. As to the problem of Nishida’s am­
biguous position toward nationalism, see: Arisaka YOko, “ The Nishida Enigma,”  in 
Monumenta Nipponica, 51-1 (1996), pp. 81-99, and the following translation o f 
Nishida’s Sekai shin chitsujo no genri [The Principle of the New
World Order].
20 In fact, here Nishida deals with an opposition superior to that of black and white 
(according to Aristotle, the opposition of contraries), as the “ extreme limit o f oppos­
ing things.”  See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 4, 10.
unity and the foundation (self-identity: jikodOitsu) of these opposi­
tions (contradiction: mujun). The nature of such a relationship cannot 
be reduced to simple identity. Instead, it must be a “ radically contradic­
tory identity,”  in which there is a perfect equivalence between terms. 
This prevents identity from prevailing over contradiction and vice 
versa.19
Mutually opposing things, in a sense, must be identical. [Let’s 
assume] they oppose each other more than white and black, 
more than red and blue. Things that have no relationship be­
tween them cannot even be said to be in contradiction; the ex­
treme limit of opposing things is their mutual contradiction. 
Here we cannot say in any sense that they are identical. Never­
theless, if they simply had no relationship, they could neither 
contradict each other. Such an identity must be something 
which is and is not, which is contradictory in itself, that is, it 
must be a contradictory self-identity. (XI, 187-188, emphasis 
added)
In this quotation, Nishida uses the term “ contradiction” in an 
Aristotelian sense.20 And yet, even in this extreme case of opposition, 
the opposites must have some sort of relationship, otherwise they
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couldn’t contradict each other.
How should this relationship between self-identity and contradiction 
be interpreted? To answer this question, we first have to consider the en­
tire span of Nishida’s philosophical career as an attempt, beyond tradi­
tional onto-theology, to conceive of a non-negating meaning of nega­
tion. In this general trend, the Buddhist influence is quite strong. As is 
known, Nishida’s concept of Absolute Nothingness (zettai mu 
comes from a philosophical elaboration of the concept of “ void” (Jap. 
ktl 5*, Skt. &2nyata), as the negation of substantiality, of the self­
nature (Skt. svabhOva. l&p.jisho  gffi) of things. According to this con­
ception, things are “ void”  (abhOva or muga Mft) because they are not 
self-sufficient, emerging from the network of interrelations of causal 
chaining (Skt. pratUyasamutpQda, Jap. engi » jg) in which things are 
endlessly changing. It is this unceasing dynamism that makes things as 
they are, hence the positive—or better, non-negative—meaning of the 
term. In Absolute Nothingness, as philosophical interpretation of 
kQt every opposition is mediated by an absolute self-negation, that 
“ wraps” (tsutsumu contradiction without simply reducing the 
Particular.21 The same negation must negate itself, but not in the sense 
of double negation in formal logic that is equivalent to affirmation, as 
the negation of the negation of position.
Absolute Nothingness could be interpreted as a way of rethinking, 
through the impulse of Buddhist tradition, the speculative axis so fun­
damental in Western thought, which binds negation to determination. 
The famous sentence by Spinoza: “ Omnis determined io est negatio" 
(Every determination is negation), appeals to the positivity/position of 
every assertion, including negation, and conceives the negative neces­
sarily as the affirmative of another position. Using Nishidian terminolo­
gy, this means a “ relative negation,”  i.e., a negation which negates an 
affirmation on the basis of another affirmation.22
21 See Abe Masao, “ Nishida’s Philosophy of ’Place,’ ”  in International Philosophi­
cal Quarterly. 28-4 (1988), 355-371.
22 Overcoming the negative value of the concept of determination is the path taken 
by L. Tarca. See his Elenchos. Ragione e paradosso nella filosofia contemporanea 
[Elenchos. Reason and Paradox in the Contemporary Philosophy) Genova: Marietti, 
1993; and Logica Philosophica. La filosofia come determinazione del positivo univer­
sale [Logica Philosophica. Philosophy as the Determination of the Universal Positive), 
Salerno: Magazzino, 1995. I thank Professor Tarca for his suggestions and comments 
on this point.
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On the contrary, in Nishida a self-contradictory negation is a 
Horizon (or “ Place,”  basho) that “ wraps”  (tsutsumu) every opposi- 
tion/relationship as the most inclusive Place. This Absolute Nothing­
ness (zettai mu) is beyond Being and Non-Being as their dialectical self­
negation. It is not something in front of which one can stand. Being 
not opposed to anything inside of it (oite aru mono <>o),
there is no distinction between this Place and the wrapped thing. Abso­
lute Nothingness then is the True Subject of things (XI, 397).13 Accord­
ingly, relative is no longer a determination, but a self-determination 
(jikogentei or self-negation (jikohitei of the Abso­
lute, i.e., the final point of the process of the radical self-negation of 
the Absolute in the Relative. In this way, Relative is the Absolute and 
nothing remains of the Absolute. At the same time, the Relative also 
radically negates itself, and the final point of this self-negation is the 
Absolute. In this way, the Absolute is the Relative and nothing remains 
of the Relative. In other words, Absolute and Relative found each 
other through mutual self-negation. This self-negation is the key con­
cept to understanding the religious relationship between Self and the 
Absolute,24 as well as between Self and the World, and Self and the 
Other. In order to make this action/negation between things possible, 
a Medium (baikaisha is needed which cannot be a thing, but the 
nonsubstantial ground of things:
Action can be conceived as a combination of mutual negative 
elements, but for such a combination, there must be a Medi­
um which is contradictorily self-identical. From the position 
of such a Medium, it can be said that what interacts in mutual 
opposition constitutes both of the extremes of the Medium’s 
self-determination and the emerging of one result from 
mutual determination of the extremes may be considered as 
the self-transformation of this same Medium, as contradicto­
ry self-identity. (XI, 382)
In this quotation, it is important to note that the interrelation between 
things does not derive from things—i.e., from opposing positions 
which come into contact, as if they did not have any previous link—but
n  I am deeply grateful to Professor Abe for this explanation.
24 See X I, 426 ff.
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from this Medium. It is such a relationship that makes things appear as 
self-determinations of the Medium. This Medium is not simply identi­
cal with itself, but it is a contradictory self-identity. In this position, 
nothing is canceled, or distorted, but everything, simply because it 
exists, exists as-such (sono mama). Only in such a non-position can 
the Wondrous Being appear, where neither thought nor things are 
negated.25
25 See: Abe M ., "Nishida’s Philosophy o f  ‘Place,’ ”  368 ff.
26 See, e .g ., Nishida Kitard, nbm, 16 ff. In this, Nishida evidently is inspired by 
Hegel. However, mediating it through the influence o f  Leibniz’s monadology, he over­
comes the simple primacy o f the Category and affirms the contemporaneous plurality 
o f  the world. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that also in the case o f  Heidegger, it 
is once again Leibniz who suggested to him the notion o f  World (Welt), as opposed to 
Hegelian acosmism. (See M. Heidegger, Gesamtsausgabe, XXIV, 248.)
27 Nishida Kitard, nbm, 18.
The world o f  the dialectical universal
Inside the historical world, self-negation has a relevant meaning. The 
historical world is the world of interaction (aihataraki) between individ­
uals, which negate each other.26 In the case of two terms A and B, the 
action of A upon B is the negation of B by A, so that A becomes the 
Universal (ippansha -<$#) of B. However, in this negation, A also 
negates itself as Particular. That is, it is the self-negation of A .27 Unlike 
Hegel, in this dialectical movement, A-as-world is not conceived as 
being at the end of a more or less linear process, in which it has to 
negate itself to triumph over B. In fact, A is one Particular among 
several. Accordingly, this action/negation of A is not exclusive: B too 
acts upon A, and so A and B are reciprocally equivalent: A is at the 
same time (i.e., as contradictory self-identity) active and passive 
towards B. In other words, it is at the same time influenced by the ac­
tion of other Individuals, as Created (tsukurareta mono 
and acting upon the other Individuals, as Creating (fsukuru mono
% o ). This world of inter-negations is a dialectical world (benshOhOteki 
sekai where A cannot be considered part of a one-layered
process, according to which it is first a Particular and then a Universal. 
A is at the same time Universal which acts upon B and Particular that 
receives the action from B.
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In this historical world therefore there is a kind of pluralism incon­
ceivable in the Hegelian system. Indeed, Nishida admits the influence 
of Leibniz in his thought and what draws them so near is the idea of the 
world as an all-embracing place for irreducible Individuals.28 Neverthe­
less, Nishida does not deprive the individual of its relationships with 
the world: he does not make it a Monad having ‘"neither doors nor win­
dows.”  The unique Individual is not put into question by any action on 
the part of other individuals, since these Individuals also negate them­
selves. It is the reciprocal transformation (action-negation-relations­
hip) of the Individuals that corresponds to the self-formation of the 
world, in which the world transcends itself in the Individual. This differ­
ence from Leibniz is essentially due to the influence of the above- 
mentioned Buddhist concept of engi (Skt. pratTtyasamutpildd). In fact if 
the Individuals have no self-nature, it is their constitutional interrela­
tion (i.e., their self-negating nature) which makes them as they are. Ac­
cording to Nishida, the self is thoroughly itself through a self-negation, 
i.e., through a constitutional openness to the world, while the world is 
thoroughly itself, through self-determination in the direction of the 
self, which makes the world concrete in the self.
Such a relationship is called expression (hyOgen MR):29 the world 
expresses itself in the self (determination and limitation), while the self 
expresses itself in the world (transformation of the world). In other 
words, if the self is the focal point (shoten MA) of the world, at the 
same time, it is the result of a process of self-determination of the 
world. If the self transcends the world as its self-transcendence, on the 
other hand, this is possible precisely because it is part of the world. 
Consciousness too is conceived as the function (sayO fFffl) of self­
expression of the world through signs (kigO 2fiM) that codify a language. 
A linguistic code is the result of the activity of expression carried out by 
the same world through the self. Therefore, the self is a contradictory 
self-identity, that always transcends the world transforming it, while at 
the same time returning to the world, when its movement settles, be­
coming the environment.30 From this point of view, we can say that
M  See, e.g., X I ,  185-186.
29 Sec, e.g., X I ,  149.
w  On this topic, see particularly KOsaka Masaaki, Nishida KitarO sensei no shOgai to 
shisO [The Life and Thought o f M y Teacher Nishida
KitarO], Tokyo: SObunsha, 1941, 233 flf.
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Nishida does not limit himself to clarifying the ties between the self and 
the world. He goes a step further, indicating their merging in a found­
ing reciprocity, in which the boundaries between history and nature, 
the human and the natural worlds become more and more fluid and flex­
ible than in many philosophies of the West.31 This theme of the radical 
complexity of the world, logically expressed in the contradictory self­
identity, is ontologically deepened through the concept of the historical 
body.
31 Such a fluid character was abhorred by Hegel and, notwithstanding his anti­
Hegelism, by K. Ldwith. They both saw in the attempt to indicate the connection of 
history with nature a reduction of consciousness to the symbol, as a monstrous 
manifestation of syncretism, typical o f the “ Oriental Spirit.** See Karl Ldwith, 
“ Bemerkungen zum Unterschied von Orient und Okzident,** in Sdmtliche Schrtften, 
Stuttgart: Metzler, Vol. I I ,  1983, 588 ff. On Ldwith and his relationship with Japanese 
culture, see Gianni Carchia, Introduzione [Introduction] in K. Ldwith, Scritti sul Giap- 
pone [Writings on Japan] Messina: Rubbettino, 1995.
32 Nishida Kitard, nbm, 24.
”  See also W .-S. Huh, “ The Philosophy o f History in the ‘Later* Nishida: A 
Philosophic Turn,”  m Philosophy East and West, 40, 3, 1990, 350-352.
The historical body as a symbol o f  complexity
According to Nishida, the historical world is the world of Reality (ji-  
tsuzai H ® , in which every opposition finds its own foundation. The 
main characteristic of the human world is that it is a creative world (poi­
esis or production: seisaku WfV): “ This world of the historical reality is 
not just the world from which we are born and in which we are going to 
die, but it must be the world where we create things and creating them 
we are created by them.*’32 Indeed, in his final philosophy, Nishida 
gives the body a great ontological and cognitive value. In fact, as Woo- 
Sung Huh explains, in the transition from the logicistic period to the 
historical ontology a great change occurs in Nishida concerning the 
significance of the external reality. In the logicistic period, Nishida 
maintains a certain dichotomy between interiority and exteriority, em­
phasizing interiority. The human being is fundamentally a homo in­
terior. Accordingly, the historical world is based upon self-awareness 
(Jikaku). Turning to historicism, Nishida eliminates this difference, 
and the external world becomes as ontologically important as the 
mind.33 It is the body that allows human beings to act upon the world
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and to receive the action from the world, i.e., to be a contradictory 
self-identity.34 Human beings are not cogito, but historical-somatic 
selves (rekishiteki shintaiteki jiko). They produce things, while in so 
doing are produced by these things. This creative interrelation between 
Created and Creating arises as extremely complex feedback,35 ex­
pressed in the concept of the “ [movement] from the Created to the 
Creating”  (tsukurareta mono kara tsukuru mono e f f b h k  %
34 See Yanagida KenjOrO gfl, Jissen tetsugaku toshite no Nishida tetsugaku
[The Philosophy of Nishida as Philosophy of Praxis], Tokyo: 
KObundO, 1939, 384.
35 Noda Matao, “ East-West Synthesis in Kitard Nishida,” in Philosophy East and 
West, 4-4, 1955, 355-356.
36 In this sense, Takeuchi’s analysis seems to me a bit too hasty. He asserts that in
Nishida the dialectical process is not deepened, to the extent that Nishida’s dialectics 
cannot contain processual dialectics. Because o f this inability, the world is absorbed in 
the mythical, ahistorical time o f the Eternal Now (Eien no ima (Takeuchi
Yoshitomo, “ Nishida tetsugaku no kOiteki chokkan,”  in “Nishida tetsugaku no 
koiteki chokkan,” Tokyo: NObunkyO, 1992,16-17.) This criticism by Takeuchi means 
that Nishida’s dialectics is unable to overcome Hegelian dialectics.
37 One o f the main differences between Nishida and Tanabe on this point is that, 
while, according to Nishida, Species negates itself for the sake of Individual, in Tanabe 
it coincides with the irrational ties inside society, and can become a hindrance between
which stresses the dialectical process in its temporal aspect 
(while the above-mentioned structure of the dialectical world defines 
the process of spatial inter-negation).36 The merely formal starting 
point of such a process is the passive, Created being—close to Heideg- 
gerian Befindlichkeit—which acts upon the Creating. The starting 
point is merely formal, since the Creating also comes from a previous 
condition of passivity. (VIII, 546-547)
For Nishida, the historical body has a strong symbolic value (in the 
original meaning of the Greek symbdllein, or “ put together” ). In fact, 
much more than consciousness, which was the dominant concept in 
Western logocentric thought, the historical body reveals the human 
being as a multi-layered contradictory self-identity.
This trait of fertile complexity is the core of Nishida’s conception of 
Man. More than consciousness (ishiki < » ),  the body is a structure be­
longing to all the levels of the world. It is physical and biological, and 
thus human beings act by instinct (honnO * tg ),  according to our Spe­
cies (shu ® ).37 Nevertheless, we are truly human only in the historical
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world, which includes the worlds of physics and biology, and moves 
towards the individual through a self-transcending movement. (VIII, 
543) Moreover, Nishida describes the manifold active and passive bodi­
ly relationships. On the one hand, Man is a biological body, i.e., has a 
passive attitude toward the environment. On the other, he has a body, 
as a means (or tool) of expression and action.38 Therefore, Man is ac­
tive and passive, immanent and transcendent, because while he is, as in 
Bergson, a “ tool-making animal” and a homo Jaber, nevertheless this 
creativity is immersed in a closely-knit network of interactions, where 
the Created cannot be reduced to a simple passive object, but influ­
ences and modifies the Creating.
Summarizing, it is possible to find at least three important meanings 
in Nishida’s conception of the historical body: 1) the body functions as 
a principle of individuation.39 In fact, Reality forms itself in the individ­
ual through the body. The absolute nature of reality as contradictory 
self-identity is nothing but this self-formation of reality in the individ­
ual body. 2) The historical body is the core of the natural and the histor­
ical process. 3) Finally, the body becomes the crucial point of the pro­
cess of active intuition, because it is as historical-somatic selves that “ we 
see the things in an active-intuitive way.” (VII, 546) Therefore, the 
historical body is the symbol and the point of convergence of the mul­
tilayered structure of the historical reality and its logic of contradictory 
self-identity.
Dialectical vs. direct intuition
In this general framework, kbiteki chokkan is not only a theory of 
knowledge, at least in the sense this word has in contemporary 
epistemology. It is perhaps more precise to consider action-intuition as 
an ontology concerning the problem of human action and cognition 
with (and within) the world.
Nishida refuses the distinction between action and intuition, main- 
gender and individual. See J. Heisig, “Tanabe’s Logic of the Specific and the Critique 
of the Global Village,”  in Eastern Buddhist, 28-2 (1995), 198-224.
M See, e.g., IX, 178.
w  Therefore action-intuition is a praxis (yisse/i WH) as a way to “create things out­
side the body,” and at the same time as “ extension of the bodily movement.”  (VIII, 
550)
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tained by both common sense and intuitionism:
By intuition, people immediately think of simple passivity, a 
kind of state of trance. Intuition is considered as the exactly 
opposite state of action. Action and intuition could be con­
ceived on the grounds of a conceptual distinction. It is 
thought that the two terms cannot mutually combine com­
pletely. (. . .] By intuition, generally a simple absorption of 
the self into things, the disappearing of action is meant. 
However, we must consider this same starting point as a prob­
lem. (VIII, 541-542)
Even in the subject-object opposition, it is impossible to be detached 
from the historical world: “ Also the subject-object division and opposi­
tion must be founded on a dialectical movement of the historical 
world.” (VIII, 542) The dialectical movement of reality remains inside 
reality: “ Therefore, reality, by overcoming reality, moves towards real­
ity.”  (VIII, 563) This dialectical character of intuition is clearly 
stressed:
Intuition does not mean [. . .] a simple negation of the proc­
ess, so that the Ultimate Truth may be seen all at once. This is 
an extremely childish and mystical way of thinking. Even ar­
tistic intuition is not anything similar. Intuition is an infinite 
process. Physics too is based upon an infinite process of 
infinite active intuition of our own historical and physical per­
ceptions. Inside the intuitive process, each point is the begin­
ning and the end. (XI, 153-154)
This notion of intuition as opposed to any immediate fusion is directly 
connected to the rejection of the concept of a self-sufficient entity that 
may bypass the mediating process. It must be noted that this statement 
shows quite a different orientation from the direct, i.e., a-processual 
(or pre-processual) nature of experience, so important in Zen no 
kenkyQ. (1 ,9 ff.) What changes here is that intuition is no longer an Ab­
solute: experience occurs in the world. It does not arise from an abso­
lute starting point, nor end absolutely, but it is an interrelated process; 
it is an integral part of the global whole of links which form the world.
Therefore, the concept of pure datum is criticized: “ Action-intuition 
is not ’the totality at once.’ It is just that I disagree with the idea that,
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as with traditional epistemologists, the starting point is the discriminat­
ing subject, and in opposition to it, the datum is simply material, or ir­
rational.”  (VIII, 565-566) In fact, “ a subject in itself (sono mono 
i  o ),  an object in itself do not exist.”  (VIII, 568) "Inside the world of 
historical development [. . .], a pure datum does not exist; the datum is 
Created.”  (VIII, 545) And again: "The datum is a Created and is also 
a Creating the Creating as Created.” (VIII, 551) In other words, every 
"datum” is included in the dialectics of the "movement from the Creat­
ed to the Creating.”
From this point of view, it is abstract starting from the an sich, as if 
this would be the definitive starting point: "Even in the case of dialec­
tics, I cannot agree with the concept of the datum, of the immediate, 
as a simple an sich. What I call the historical reality is always an und 
fursich .”  (VIII, 566) Unlike Hegelian dialectics, in which History is a 
process which includes totality, in the dialectics of place (bashoteki 
bensho hO "conceptual continuity must be negated”
(ibid.) and historical development cannot be conceived as continuous. 
On the contrary, it is a "discontinuous continuity” (hirenzoku no ren- 
zoku O l f o M ) ,  or a "continuity of interruption” (danzetsu no ren- 
zoku VriHoiSIR), in which conceptual, rational progression is replaced 
by an inter-negative structure as an Eternal Present (eien no genzai 
where it is impossible to establish an order of priority, as in a 
linear process.
The controversy about datum involves the traditional scientific 
method as well. Science is accused of being based on certain aspects of 
reality detached from the concrete flow of events.40 Everything must be 
brought back to the function of historical formation (rekishiteki keisei 
sayO which also gives rise to the subject-object distinc­
tion in a self-contradictory way. Therefore, the same abstract analysis 
is part of the totality. Then, against Kant, Nishida argues that "science 
itself developed inside the historical world. When an epistemologist
40 This method o f  abstraction criticized by Nishida is the core o f  Galileo’s experimen­
tal science. In fact, when Galileo devised the experiment o f  a falling body, he decided 
to reduce what was to be observed inside the given system. He decided, for example, to 
regard the falling body as if it were in a void, generating no friction with the air, while 
Aristotelian orthodoxy would have firmly refused such a simplification. See E. 
Severino, La filosofia moderna (Modern Philosophy!, Milan: Rizzoli, 9 ff.; 39-41.
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uses the word ‘to know,’ he is already determining the sense of objec­
tive knowledge.” (XI, 150) Inside this abstract system, the observer is 
not present, as if  there were a “ viewpoint from nowhere” : “ Here the 
knower has been already removed. Still a type of knowing in which the 
knower disappears is inconceivable.”  (XI, 150) On the contrary, 
knowledge arises from an entre deux of subject and object: “ Our 
knowledge neither arises from the simple world of things, nor from the 
simple world of the self. To employ an expression used since ancient 
times, it arises from the mutual determination of the subject and object 
of knowledge.” (XI, 154) Moreover, according to Nishida the point of 
observation is circularly implied in the observed system: as in Heideg­
ger, Merleau-Ponty, and some contemporary epistemologists,41 cogni­
tion cannot be considered apart from the flux of events and things 
which constitute the world.
41 For instance, I can mention the names o f  Edgard Morin, Heinz Von Foerster, Ilya 
Prigogine, Isabelle Stangers, Douglas Hofstadter, Francisco Varela. There is a striking 
resemblance between Nishida’s position and the conceptions expressed by M. Merleau- 
Ponty in his essay, LXEil e t PEsprit, Paris: Gallimard, 1964.
42 See Kosaka M ., Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 170. A somewhat similar 
distinction can be found also in Kosaka Kunitsugu (Nishida KitarO. Sono shisO to gen- 
dai, 77-78) who draws a distinction between the noetic and the noematic sides o f  the 
world. They correspond respectively to the Individual aspect, where action is stronger 
than intuition, and the world o f  expression, where action is weaker.
KOiteki chokkan or knowing as becoming
Facing the problem of the observer’s involvement in the act of cogni­
tion, Nishida claims that knowledge is always a practical, experiential 
act. Action-intuition is called “ an extremely realistic position of 
knowledge, as the grounds of any empirical knowledge. I define it as a 
position of knowledge based upon experience, as extremely experien­
tial.”  (VIII, 541)
As KOsaka Masaaki states, kOiteki chokkan, which nonetheless is a 
unitary concept, can be interpreted as both “ action-as-intuition” and 
“ intuition-as-action,”  even if in the concrete experiential act these two 
moments are always bound together.42 Through the theme of “ intui- 
tion-as-action” (seeing as acting), Nishida aims at overcoming the com­
mon idea of sensorial intuition, according to which acting and know-
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ing are opposite. Against realism, Nishida asserts that when the self 
observes an object, it is moved (Latin: commotio) by it through the 
selfs act of knowledge. It is driven to express, to modify the world. 
Therefore, objects are not merely passive towards the subject: they act 
upon the subject and provoke its action. This aspect of koiteki chok- 
kan is connected with the artistic theory of Konrad Fiedler (1841-1895), 
according to whom when an artist is deeply immersed in the vision of 
objects, he spontaneously turns to creative action. Accordingly, vision 
is creation, i.e., it generates the creative act, and in practical experience 
no distinction can be drawn between these two moments.43 4 This aspect 
of koiteki chokkan is also expressed by Nishida through phrases as fol­
lows:
43 See Kosaka M ., Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 171-172. For a detailed
analysis o f the relationship between Nishida and Fiedler, sec particularly: Takanashi 
Tomohiro “  ‘Geijutsuron’ toshite no Nishida tetsugaku: Nishida KitarO no
tai Fldora kankei o megutte”
<* o X  [The Philosophy o f Nishida as “ Theory o f A rt” : About Nishida Kitard’s 
Relationship with Fiedler], in Bigaku 47-2 (1996), pp. 13-22.
44 See also Kosaka K ., Nishida KitarO. Sono shisO to gendai, 119-120.
Mono to natte mi, mono to natte okonau
To see, becoming things; to act, becoming things.
Mono ga kitatte ware wo terasu
Things come and illuminate me.
These expressions are clearly influenced by the Buddhist doctrine of the 
non-Ego (muga), in which, losing one’s own self-identity, self-aware­
ness is attained. In this condition, knowledge becomes “ seeing without 
a seer” (mim mono nakushite miru L X l.* ),  “ knowing
without a knower” (shiru mono nakushite shim t  oZt < 
in which the subject of the action-intuition is no longer a conscious sub­
ject detached from the object, but is immersed (botsunyQ S A ) in 
things. This is the condition of unity between body and mind (shinjin 
ichinyo in), between I and things (butsuga ichinyo
where the I is truly I and the things are truly things. Without this move­
ment of self-negation, knowledge would be a pure distortion of the ob-
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ject, which would simply become a part of the subject.45 In this self­
negation of the subject, action-intuition is clearly manifested as an ar­
ticulation of Absolute Nothingness (zettai mu). While, for example, 
the idealism of Fiedler considers the cognitive process as a one-sided 
creation of the world by the mind, in Nishida the object is in a con­
tradictory and complex relationship in which the object is identical 
with the subject, for it negates itself in the subject, and contemporarily 
it is entirely itself, for the subject negates itself in the object. In other 
words, koiteki chokkan is not simply subjective, but indicates a struc­
tural relationship with the objective side of the historical world.46
45 Kdsaka M., Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 171-172.
46 See Takanashi Tomohiro, “ Geijutsuron . . .,”  p.17.
47 KOsaka, ibid., 176-177.
“ Action-as-intuition”  (acting as seeing), indicates the fundamental 
dependence of cognition upon somatic structure. Unlike Idealism, in a 
historical-biological body purely intellectual intuition cannot be con­
ceived. Intuition or cognition means “ to grasp things somatically,” 
(VIII, 549) inside the world of production. This somatic action has a 
twofold meaning: on the one hand, it stresses the Individual in its par­
ticularity; on the other hand, the Species (both in the biological and so- 
cio-historical senses) is asserted. Our actions are a kind of “ instinctual 
movement”  (honnO dOsa as a “movement of formation of
the Species.”  (VIII, 543) The Species in Nishida is involved in a 
relationship of contradictory self-identity with the environment, (VIII, 
553) in which it negates itself, creating the individual. Active intuition 
takes place according to our Species, i.e., our cognition always con­
cerns the bodily and perceptive structure of our Species.47 However, ac­
tive intuition does not correspond to simple perception (chikaku & < ). 
Rather, “ perception must also be active-intuitive.”  (ibid.) In fact, the 
physical-perceptive structure cannot be considered outside the histori­
cal world. Therefore, nature itself is historical. (VIII, 551) Further­
more: “ We do not see things in a purely sensorial way, but we grasp 
them subjectively. Therefore, this is a historical-social [event].” (VIII, 
555) Interestingly enough, it is at the bottom of this subjectivity that its 
roots are sinking into the objectivity of the world, and vice versa.
Translating Nishida’s argument into the terminology of modern 
science, this would probably mean that cognition does not occur as if
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the observer stood in God’s omniscient position, but it is always rela­
tive to our physical structure and to the methods and the behavioral 
strategies we learn from our cultural and social environment. In fact, 
we learn to be in the world not through abstract notions, but thanks to 
cultural and historical forms of behavior, conceivable as automatisms 
concerning the body, the practical knowledge.48 By the way, Japanese 
arts, or geidO Sjfi, from the tea ceremony to calligraphy, as well as mar­
tial arts, transmit their knowledge through an educational method in 
which the practitioner, through steady practice, memorizes numerous 
rigidly codified bodily movements and positions as an essential part of 
mastering an art.49
48 For example, in his genetic epistemology, Piaget has explained that the cognitive 
contact o f the child with the environment does not occur on the grounds o f a detached 
observation, but through concrete touching with the environment. See La naissance de 
[ ’intelligence chez I ’enfant, Delachaux et Niestte Neuchdtel, 1948; and Introduction d 
I ’Episttmologie gtnttique, 3 vol., puf, Paris, 1950.
49 See also Nakamura YQjirO, KOiteki chokkan to Nihon no geijutsu [Action- 
Intuition and Japanese Arts], in Nakamura YQjirO, Nishida tetsugaku, Tokyo: Iwana- 
mi shoten, 1993, 253-277.
50 See Kosaka Kunitsugu, “ Gendai Nihon tetsugaku to zettai mu: Tanabe Hajime to 
Takahashi Satomi no Nishida tetsugaku hihan”  31ft
[Modem Japanese philosophy and Absolute Nothingness: The criti­
cisms o f Tanabe Hajime and Takahashi Satomi toward Nishida’s philosophy), in 
KenkyQ kiyO 20 (1995), p. I I .
Contradictory self-identity and koiteki chokkan
According to Kosaka Kunitsugu, the relationship between koi and 
chokkan inside Nishidian dialectical logic has a more conjunctive than 
disjunctive sense. For example, koi soku chokkan, chokkan soku koi, 
does not mean an opposition between action and intuition, but rather 
their mutual generation. Then, in action-intuition there is a slight ten­
dency to stress identity over contradiction, unity over opposition.50 
However, in this way, Kosaka says, Nishida is already quite far from 
the equality between self-identity and contradiction we saw at the core 
of his dialectical logic. In fact, continues Kosaka, in Nishida the con­
cept of contradiction (mujun) is not-exclusive or alternative, as in 
Hegel and Marx; rather it is “ identifying” (sOsokuteki 4SSPW), or 
“ reciprocally complemental”  (sOhoteki This involves a weaken-
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ing of the negative side of contradictory self-identity.51 Is it possible to 
solve this aporia? Certainly, Nishida did realize that the overcoming of 
simple identity was a pressing need. The very general orientation of his 
philosophical career shows a progressive shift from certain monistic 
temptations in Zen no kenkyQ, to a kind of pluralism in the philosophy 
of the historical world, even if probably it could be said that this 
change is somehow still incomplete and ambiguous. In fact, the con­
cept of mujunteki jikodOitsu is really polymorphous52 and escapes 
definitive assessment. For example, the concept of contradiction fluc­
tuates from the Aristotelian meaning, which we saw before, to a 
“ softer”  use, as in koiteki chokkan, where actually, as Kosaka shows, 
the sense of opposition between action and intuition cannot be but sec­
ondary in comparison with their unity. I think we can probably find an 
answer in the concept of the Dialectical World. In fact, this was empha­
sized by Nishida himself: “ The position of the Dialectical Universal 
was made direct as the position of active intuition.”  (I, 6)
51 Kosaka K., ibid., p. 11.
52 In his systematic exposition o f  the concept, Yanagida Kenjdrd draws up a list o f 
at least thirteen different meanings o f  the concept. See his Jissen tetsugaku toshite no 
Nishida tetsugaku, 416-430.
What negates what? Like Kosaka, I think that in koiteki chokkan ne­
gation cannot mean that action negates cognition or vice versa, for this 
would necessarily blur any distinction between the Nishidian active in­
tuition and sensorial or intellectual intuition. In my opinion, contradic­
tory self-identity in active-intuition indicates the structure of the dialec­
tical world, and in particular the historical body, as the foundation of 
the relationship between action and intuition. In this dialectical struc­
ture, the somatic individual negates the environment (kankyO J39t): 
“ Seeing things in action-intuition means that things are seen, having to 
be negated,” (VIII, 549) but this negation emphasizes the subjective 
side of the mutual negation between subject and things inside the histor­
ical world. Accordingly, action-intuition is the subjective state o f  the di­
alectical world. In fact: “ To grasp objects, reality and so on as praxis, 
as Subjective, must be to grasp them in the sense of active intuition.” 
(VIII, 550; emphasis added) Consequently, an identifying relationship 
between action and intuition does not represent an aporia from 
Nishida’s point of view. Unlike Junsui keiken, where the subjective
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state of unity seems to be the sole reality, kOiteki chokkan is limited to 
the subjective side of the relationship, while the dialectical world has to 
be interpreted as the foundation of both subject and object.
What about the contradictory self-identity in its relationship with ac­
tive intuition? I think it is possible to agree with Yanagida KenjUrO 
when he says that contradictory self-identity in action-intuition indi­
cates that the historical body is the central point of the world, which 
forms itself historically/3 The historical body in fact is the symbol of 
the historical world as the complex, nonlinear reality which contains all 
the oppositions. In fact, the body is not only subjective, i.e., it is not 
connected only to active-intuition. It is also a part of the world, as a 
movement from the Created to the Creating. Kbiteki chokkan inside 
the final ontology of Nishida is relatively less important than junsui kei- 
ken inside his first elaboration, precisely due to this concept of the 
historical body which has the function of a trait d'union between “ out­
er”  and “ inner” worlds. KOiteki chokkan is the subjective side of the 
historical world, and this means the negation of the environment ac­
complished by the subject; thus Nishida’s position has much in com­
mon with Marx’s position according to which the subject, in order to 
become free, must transform nature through his own work.54 
However, in Nishida’s philosophy a way to escape subjectivism is indi­
cated in this very act of subjective negation as movement of contradic­
tory self-identity performed by the historical world itself.
Active intuition can be interpreted as the limitation of the same 
Logos, of the same Reason which in practical action is absorbed by 
things, and becomes the object of its knowledge/action (mono to natte 
mi, mono to natte okonau), while at the same time things are negated, 
becoming the Thought. In this way, active intuition is a process in 
which the subject becomes things: “ A is expressed inside B, it is a point 
of view of self-expression of B. Consequently, I always say that one 
thinks, by becoming things, one acts, by becoming things.” (XI, 381) 
It would be possible to read such a statement as a self-limitation of the
”  See also Yanagida K., ibid., 384.
M On Marx’s concept o f  work as essence o f  Man as Subject, see M. Ruggenini, **Es- 
senza del moderno. SoggettivitA valore, lavoro” [Essence o f  Modernity. Subjectivity, 
Value, Work] in II D io della filosofia e il D io della fed e  [The God o f Philosophy and 
the God o f Faith], Venice, 1988.
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same system of thought, a philosophy which encounters the very event 
of the world. Therefore, active intuition indicates that the same 
philosophy transforms itself into practice. In Nishitani’s words, “ One 
breaks through the conscious ego and thinks about facts by becoming 
the facts one is thinking about. It does not merely philosophize, as has 
been in the past, but becomes philosophizing.” 35
Does active intuition have any possible meaning for our common 
knowledge? I think that where Nishida’s action-intuition can be most 
practically fruitful is in the comparison with Francisco Varela’s con- 
tructivistic theory of knowledge.56 Varela admittedly finds in Phenome­
nology and Buddhism much inspiration for creating a new theory of 
cognition, and extensively quotes Nishitani Keiji as one of his sources. 
Trying to overcome traditional concepts of representation, he affirms 
that concrete knowledge is not based on any abstract Archimedean 
point. Indeed, the embodied experience of cognition occurs even with­
out any theoretical foundation. Instead, it emerges as an entre deux 
where world and subject arise at the same time. He also explains this 
theory experimentally. There is insufficient space here to go into 
Varela’s epistemology in depth. Suffice it to say that the similarities 
with Nishida are striking and many promising results are possible in de­
veloping such a comparison.
Critics on koiteki chokkan
In this essay, I maintained that in koiteki chokkan action and intuition 
have the same ontological value, but this interpretation is far from 
being commonly accepted by some critics such as Tanabe Hajime and 
Takeuchi Yoshitomo. Through different arguments, they affirm that 
action-intuition is a form of Contemplativism, a new type of intuitionis- 
tic metaphysics, not far from Plotinus (according to Tanabe) or Hegel 
(according to Takeuchi).
According to Tanabe, koiteki chokkan is an “ intuition of Absolute 
Nothingness” (zettai mu no chokkan eSfM oiOO or an “ action guided
55 Nishitani Keiji, Nishida KitarO. Sono hito to  shiso [English translation Nishida 
KitarO by Yamamoto S. & J. Heisig, Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1991, 
1801.
*  F. J. Varela, E. Thompson, E . Rosch, The Em bodied Mind. Cognitive Science 
and Human Experience, Cambridge, M A, London: MIT Press, 1991.
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by intuition of Nothingness.” 57 However, this is a contradiction in ad- 
jecto, because a seen action is not an action anymore. It is conscious­
ness. Then, concludes Tanabe, kOiteki chokkan is just contemplative 
consciousness, having nothing to do with the true action. It is just an 
aesthetic and artistic action.58 As Kosaka states, it is particularly about 
the problem of moral and political action, or praxis, that Tanabe harsh­
ly criticizes Nishida’s concept of action-intuition. If koiteki chokkan is 
a kind of instinct guided by a learned skill, then it is a kind of natural­
ism, an intuitionistic vitalism (seimeishugi which destroys the
57 Tanabe Hajime, Tanabe Hajime zenshQ, Vol. VII, 318.
58 THZ, VI, 472. See also Kosaka, “Gendai Nihon tetsugaku to zettai mu,** 12-13.
59 KOsaka Masaaki, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, p. 81.
* Tanabe Hajime, Shu no ronri toshite no benshOhO 
Osaka: Akitaya, 1947, 96-97.
61 Tanabe, ibid., 98 where a reference is made to Plotinus, Enneades, V, 37.
62 Tanabe, ibid., 99-100. Interestingly enough, here Tanabe acknowledges that there 
is an equivalence between “ action-for-the-sake-of-intuition” and “ intuition-for-the- 
sake-of-action.”
true meaning of practical action. On the contrary, if koiteki chokkan is 
but an intellectual intuition, everything becomes the content of the 
self-conscious intuition of Nothingness. Then again, the meaning of ac­
tion is lost in a sort of contemplativism. Consequently, praxis cannot 
be grounded.59
According to Tanabe, in Nishida’s dialectics of action, an individual 
intuition of the world is needed. In such an intuition, the individual as 
acting subject returns to the Absolute One, which, as Absolute 
Nothingness, determines the acting self. Consequently, intuition deter­
mines action. It is for the sake of action.60 Tanabe acknowledges there 
is a difference between Nishida and Plotinus. As a matter of fact, the 
latter asserts that action is for the sake of intuition. Plotinus’ thought 
is an example of Greek Aesthetism (geijutsushugi £ffi£l£), which 
tends to “ revere contemplation and detest action and work.” 61 Cer­
tainly Nishida, according to Tanabe, is different from such a pure, radi­
cal form of aesthetism, but he is closer to an “ Aesthetism, mingled 
with modern Libertarism and Oriental Activism (toyo no koishugi 
o f r S i B ) .”  However it is not a simple syncretic compromise (setcha 
konkO since it grasps a characteristic feature of Japanese
arts, in which intuition is for the sake of action.62 It is just that, accord-
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ing to him, in kditeki chokkan intuition is the immediate (mubaikai 
foundation of action. This lack of mediation leads to a sort of 
emanationism (hasshutsushugi in which “ human relativity is
negated,” ending up in mere “ mysticism,”  whose aim is the “ union 
with the Absolute of God.” 63 In fact: “ In kOiteki chokkan, intuition is 
stressed as a guide to action and through this the antinomic contradic­
tions of the relative action should be sublated.” In Tanabe’s interpreta­
tion, this is caused by the strong Jiriki (Self-Power) trait of 
Nishida’s philosophy, which comes from a “ Zen intuition” {zenteki 
chokkan Against this, Tanabe opposes his own position of
Absolute (Other-Power), where the religious Aesthetism
is replaced by the “ mediative moment of Nothingness as absolute con­
version.” 64 As Kosaka Kunitsugu suggests, certainly there are many 
misunderstandings in this criticism. In the first place, chokkan is not 
mu no chokkan, i.e., an intuition o f  nothingness, which is impossible, 
but it is the consciousness {jikaku) of the identification with things.65 
Moreover, this consciousness, I contend, is the foundation of action, 
just as action is the foundation of consciousness.
Different in premises but similar in conclusions, the criticism raised 
by Takeuchi Yoshitomo points out the connection between Nishida’s 
acting-intuition and Hegel, who affirms that the substance of action is 
vision.66 The same kOiteki chokkan could be reduced to a self-aware­
ness {jikaku) at the foundation of action. Therefore, in Takeuchi’s 
opinion, Nishida does not avoid a bad, old habit of Western metaphys­
ics, putting theoria before praxis, and falling into the same contem- 
plationism (kansO R $ )  Marx had criticized in Hegel.67 Therefore, both 
in Tanabe and Takeuchi we can find a similar objection. However, as I 
understand it, something not completely convincing still remains. It 
seems to me that they particularly fail to properly consider the impor­
tance of the historical body inside action-intuition. A correct evalua-
43 Tanabe, ibid., 106.
44 Tanabe, ibid., 108-110.
63 Kosaka K., ibid. Kosaka acutely points out that this is due to Tanabe’s way of un­
derstanding zettai mu. According to Tanabe, religious consciousness is no grounds for 
ethical action. On the contrary, it is ethical action which is the grounds of conscious­
ness of Absolute Nothingness.
* Takeuchi Yoshitomo, Nishida tetsugaku no kOiteki chokkan, 10.
47 Takeuchi, ibid., 87-93.
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tion of such an aspect could help revise this charge of intellectualism 
against Nishida. In fact:
Thinking that the formative function of history is founded 
upon action-intuition does not mean to assert that the aim of 
human life is in an intuitive stillness. Our aim is thoroughly 
the historical formation. It is in the historical production that 
Man finds his own existence. (VIII, 550)
Our True Self is a historical practical Self. No praxis exists be­
yond the historical action. Our very thinking is a historical ac­
tion. We are aware (jikaku suru), in the place which at the 
same time is Created and Creating. Accordingly, our self is 
historical and somatic. Otherwise, this is nothing but a 
thought self, [not the thinking self]. To cling to such a self is 
an illusion (mayoi *)• [• • - J DOgen says: “ To learn the Self is 
to forget the Self; to forget the Self is to be awoken by all 
beings.” We grasp the True Self in the place where we negate 
the abstract-conscious self and become one, body and mind 
(shinjin ichinyo). We have to rethink the traditional philoso­
phies from the self-awareness of such a True practical Self, of 
the Self which is one, body and mind. (XI, 168)
A different orientation has the criticism of Yuasa Yasuo. Unlike the 
other two critics, he is very sensitive to the dimension of the body.68 In 
fact, he clearly states that “ to grasp human being-in-the-world in the 
form of the acting intuition is to grasp the structural relationship be­
tween the self and the world in light of the modality of the body.” *9 I 
perfectly agree with such a view. Nevertheless, he questionably inter­
prets kbiteki chokkan as the dialectical relationship between activity 
and passivity. Yuasa draws a distinction between two sides of the con­
cept: the first one, in which action is active and intuition is passive (com­
mon consciousness), and the other, where intuition is active and action 
is passive (deep consciousness). Here “ there is a reversal in the structur­
al relationship between passivity and activity, between the self and the 
world.” At this deep level, “ intuition is the unifying force beyond the
u  Yuasa, The Body, 49-74.
69 Yuasa, ibid., 67.
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surface self-consciousness.” 70 Accordingly, Yuasa seems to confuse to 
a certain extent intuition in koiteki chokkan with intuition in junsui 
keiken. (Indeed, just a few lines later he takes a quotation from Zen 
no kenkyQ, where the unifying meaning of intuition is particularly 
stressed.) I cannot agree especially with his distinction between ordina­
ry and deep level. In fact, Nishida asserts that every action or intuition 
emerges from the dimension of the Absolute Nothingness, including 
those coming from the abstract-conscious self, which Yuasa would call 
“ordinary level.”  In short, action-intuition is not a deep state of mind, 
juxtaposed to an ordinary one.
70 Yuasa, ibid.
71 Yuasa, ibid., 72.
72 Nishida suggests only a “ negation o f koiteki chokkan** in the environment (VIII, 
564), without any further explanation.
However, Yuasa somehow comes very close to a real problem in 
Nishida. It is not the fact that “ Nishida did not consciously tell us how 
to transform the dimension of everyday experience into the dimension 
of experiencing basho, ” 71 72 as Yuasa affirms; rather that in Nishida the 
relationship between ordinary knowledge (chishiki) and koiteki chok­
kan is almost left unconsidered. On the one hand, as Nishida himself 
admits: “ Obviously, I do not say that action-intuition as such is 
knowledge (cteJuArO*”  (VIII, 564) On the other, he does not clarify the 
problem of how common knowledge takes shape from koiteki chok­
kan.12
Particularly pronounced is his tendency to look at reality in a posi­
tive, transfigured way. From this point of view, the objection raised by 
Tanabe concerning the risk of absolutization of Man and the conse­
quent oblivion of its Finitude can be reconsidered under a different and 
probably more precise perspective. This remark can also make more un­
derstandable Takeuchi’s critique of Nishida’s strong resemblance with 
Hegel. The direct and most noticeable consequence of this transfigura­
tion of the Existing is that the problem of error is almost forgotten. 
How can we be sure that our knowledge is correct and not mistaken, or 
fruit of an illusion? Where is our human cognitive limit? Does it have 
any consequences on our way of living? In fact, we live in a social 
world, and thus falsehood and personal interests are unavoidable. 
How can we know the truth? Does koiteki chokkan give at least some
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hints about these crucial and indeed very practical points? Alas, we 
have to answer, “ No.”  KOiteki chokkan seems unable to solve, or at 
least to deal with, the problem of error. Alas, this problem fails to even 
be mentioned in Nishida’s pages. And though it is present (as negative), 
it is transfigured as a moment within the historical world’s creative 
process of self-transformation.
Certainly, Nishida emphasizes mainly the positive and creative 
aspect of the relationship with the world. However, doesn’t he often 
hide (or at least leave undeveloped) its destructive (or simply limiting) 
meaning? For example, Nishida seems not to consider technology as a 
problem. On the contrary, advocating the Aristotelian concept of 
“ creating nature,” (IX, 151) he naturalizes technology, making it a 
constitutional element of human beings. Here only the positive mean­
ing of technology is considered, but nothing is said about its dark side, 
which nowadays we often experience in truly dramatic ways. Here, 
Nishida’s distance from the final Heidegger could not be greater. 
Heidegger foresaw many dangers lurking inside Modernity as the Era 
of Production, where human beings themselves are considered just as 
objects and products, inside a (re)producible world.73 Nishida seems 
much more pragmatic and positive than Heidegger on the question, but 
how much did he realize the deadly risks inherent in such a position? 
Moreover, I must agree with Takeuchi, who criticizes Nishida’s way of 
facing the entire sphere of society and politics.74 Here too the problem 
of Finitude is at issue.75 By mainly looking at this finite nature positive­
ly, doesn’t he idealize the human dimension? Actually, he seems to 
look at the world from the perspective of a kind of “ Idealistic Prag­
matism,” where Ideal and Real are equivalent, and the category 
“ Real”  takes the place of the conceptual couple “ True/False.” Given 
this, the well-known hesitation of the philosopher towards nationalism
73 On this Heideggerian critique o f  Modernity, see particularly M. Ruggenini, Ilsog- 
getto e la tecnica [The Subject and the Technology], Rome: Bulzoni, 1977.
74 Takeuchi Yoshitomo, Nishida tetsugaku no koiteki chokkan, 63-64.
75 On the philosophy o f the Finitude from the perspective o f Hermeneutics, see: M. 
Ruggenini, I  fenom eni e le parole. La veritdfinita dell’ermeneutica [Phenomena and 
Words. The Finite Truth o f  Hermeneutics], Genova: Marietti, 1992 and II discorso 
deiraltro. Ermeneutica della differenza [The Discourse o f  the Other. Hermeneutics o f 
Difference], Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1996. From the point o f  view o f Philosophical Her­
meneutics, Nishida’s philosophy clearly does not face the problem o f interpretation.
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during the War undoubtedly has deep roots. He seems fundamentally 
weak towards (if not openly supportive of) the existing status quo. 
From this point of view, a remark by Suzuki Tdru seems to hit the 
mark:
In the case of Nishida, absolutely contradictory self-identity 
speaks of the contradiction between Finite and Infinite, 
Relative and Absolute, Time and Eternal, but he ends by 
transferring it as is in the realm of the Relative. Here, Nishida 
committed a fatal mistake.76
By overcoming, but also maintaining, such an idealistic philosophical 
framework, Nishida probably attained his best result, but at the same 
time this was his biggest limit.
76 Suzuki Tdru Nishida Kitaro no sekai [The World o f Nishida KitarO),Tokyo:
Keisd shobd, 1977, 147-148.
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